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I. INTRODUCTION
Virtually everyone knows that cigarettes are hazardous to one's
health.' Yet millions of adults and young people still choose to smoke and
use smokeless tobacco.2 Hundreds of thousands of people die each year
from illnesses related to smoking.3
1. See Robert A. Kagan & David Vogel, The Politics of Smoking Regulation:
Canada, France, the United States, in SMOKING PoLIcY: LAw, POLITICS, AND CULTURE
25 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993). A Gallup poll showed
that 94% of Americans surveyed thought smoking was a health hazard and a po-
tential cause of respiratory cancer and heart disease. See id. That should be no
shock, according to R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. deputy general counsel Dan
Donahue, who claims the public has known of the health risks of tobacco since at
least 1604, when King James I of England described smoking as "harmful to the
braine and dangerous to the lungs." Jill Hodges, Tobacco Tenacious in the Court-
room: Industry Has Flourished Through Decades of Litigation, STAR TRIB. (Minneapo-
lis), Sept. 15, 1996, at Al9.
2. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVICES, MORBIDrly & MORTALrTYWKLY. REP.,July 12, 1996, at 588, 588-
89. The report estimates that 25.5% of the adult population - 25.3 million men
and 22.7 million women - currently smoke. This number signifies the first time
in over a decade that smoking among adults has not decreased. See id. As of
1990, over three million American children between the ages of 8 and 17 were
daily tobacco users, consuming 947 million packs of cigarettes and 26 million con-
tainers of smokeless tobacco yearly. SeeJoseph R. DiFranza &Joe B. Tye, Who Prof-
its from Tobacco Sales to Children, 263 JAMA 2784, 2784 (1990). These numbers
increase to over five million when occasional smokers in the same age group are
included. See id. An estimated 1.7 million boys between the ages of 12 and 18 use
smokeless tobacco. See id. at 2785; see also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN
SERVICES, PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE: A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL 75 (1994) [hereinafter PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG
PEOPLE] (reporting that 29% of males and 26% of females aged 17 and 18 are
current smokers).
3. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVICES, MORBIDrY& MORTALrlYWKLY. REP., Aug. 27, 1993, at 645, 645-
49. Over 400,000 people die each year from smoking-related illnesses, which rep-
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Adolescents constitute the vast majority of all new smokers.4 One
million young persons per year - 3000 per day - become new smokers.5
These rates have increased steadily every year since 1991.6 Experts predict
that if adolescent tobacco use continues at present levels, an estimated five
million young people who were under the age of seventeen in 1995 will
die prematurely from a smoking-related illness.7 The human and eco-
nomic toll of tobacco use is significant, particularly for those who begin
smoking as adolescents.8
resents approximately 20% of all deaths. See id. This number is greater than the
total number of deaths caused by AIDS, alcohol, illegal drug use, car accidents,
fires, murders, and suicides. See id. A World Health Organization study predicts
that within 25 years, smoking will become the single largest cause of death and
disability in the world. See COMMITTEE ON PREVENTING NICOTINE ADDICTION IN
CHILDREN AND YOUTHS INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, GROWING UP TOBACCO FREE:
PREVENTING NICOTINE ADDICTION IN CHILDREN AND YOUTHS 3-4 (Barbara S. Lynch &
RichardJ. Bonnie eds., 1994). According to the study, smoking caused three mil-
lion deaths in 1990 from heart disease, lung cancer, and other disorders; extrapo-
lated to the year 2020, that number will nearly triple to 8.4 million. See Thomas
H. Maugh II, Worldwide Study Finds Big Shift in Cause of Death, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16,
1996, at Al.
4. See PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE, supra note 2, at 67.
In 1991, the average age at which smokers tried their first cigarette was 14.5; 71%
of adolescent smokers become regular smokers by age 18. See id. About 82% of
smokers who ever smoked daily began smoking before age 18, and by that age,
53% had become daily smokers. See id. at 65.
5. SeeJohn P. Pierce et al., Trends in Cigarette Smoking in the United States: Pro-
jections to the Year 2000, 261JAMA 61, 64 (1989).
6. See Press Release, University of Michigan, Monitoring the Future Study (Dec.
19, 1996). From 1991 to 1996, smoking rates among eighth graders have risen
from 14% to 21%; for 10th graders, rates rose from 21% to 30%; among 12th
graders the increase was from 28% to 34%. See id.
7. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, MORBrIY& MORTALrY WKLY. REP., Nov. 8, 1996, at 971, 971-72
[hereinafter PROJECTED SMOKING].
8. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVICES, SMOKING AND HEALTH IN THE AMERICAS 110-12 (1992) [herein-
after SMOKING AND HEALTH IN THE AMERICAS]. Total lifetime smoking-related
medical care costs in the United States are $501 billion, an average of $6239 per
smoker. See id.; PROJECTED SMOKING, supra note 7, at 973. Total annual cost
ranges from $12 billion to $35 billion, or $214 to $870 per smoker depending on
when the person developed a smoking-related illness, whether the person has
ceased or continues to smoke, and whether the person was or is a light or heavy
smoker. See SMOKING AND HEALTH IN THE AMERICAS, supra, at 110-12; PROJECTED
SMOKING, supra note 7, at 973. The health costs for those that develop smoking-
related illnesses are higher even though they live shorter lives. See SMOKING AND
HEALTH IN THE AMERICAS, supra, at 110-12; PROJECTED SMOKING, supra note 7, at
973. Total lifetime lost productivity costs due to mortality and morbidity (ill-
nesses) range between $24,221 to $68,316 for men, and $5894 to $21,765 for
women. See SMOKING AND HEALTH IN THE AMERICAS, supra, at 110-12; PROJECTED
SMOKING, supra note 7, at 973. These estimates are based on men and women
aged 40-44, including light (1-14 cigarettes per day) and heavy (at least 35 ciga-
1997]
3
Sullivan: Tobacco Talk: Why FDA Tobacco Advertising Restrictions Violate th
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1997
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
In an effort to reduce the preventable short-term and long-term
health risks of tobacco use that begin with the adolescent user, the Fed-
eral Food and Drug Administration (FDA) announced unprecedented re-
strictions on advertising, promotion, and youth access to tobacco prod-
ucts. 9  The tobacco and advertising industries responded quickly.'0
Without reaching the First Amendment issue, a federal district court in
North Carolina held that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA)" did not grant authority to the FDA to restrict the promotion and
advertisement of tobacco products. 2 In a partial victory, the court also
held that the FDA was empowered to impose access restrictions and label-
ing requirements on tobacco products." Recognizing the gravity of the
issues before it, the court certified the case for interlocutory appeal.'
4
Even if the Fourth Circuit ultimately determines that the FDA lacks
authority to restrict tobacco advertising, the First Amendment issue re-
mains.'- This Note argues that following the Supreme Court's most recent
rettes per day) smokers. See SMOKING AND HEALTH IN THE AMERICAS, supra, at 110-
12; PROJECTED SMOKING, supra note 7, at 973. If current youth smoking trends
continue, estimated future health care costs are estimated at $200 billion - i.e.,
$12,000 per smoker. See SMOKING AND HEALTH IN THE AMERICAS, supra, at 110-12;
PROJECTED SMOKING, supra note 7, at 973.
9. See FDA Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes
and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396
(1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, 897). President
Clinton unveiled the final regulations in a Rose Garden ceremony on August 23,
1996, claiming, "Joe Camel and the Marlboro Man will be out of our children's
reach forever." See David Phelps, New Rules Take Aim at Teen Smoking: Clinton Re-
stricts Cigarette Ads, STARTRIB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 24, 1996, atAl. The final regu-
lations were published on August 28, 1996. The public comment period for the
proposed regulations originally ran from publication of the proposed regulations
untilJanuary 2, 1996. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,417. Due to an unprecedented num-
ber of responses, the comment period was reopened, resulting in more than
700,000 pieces of mail, representing the views of over 1 million individuals. See id.
at 44,418. The FDA based its goal of protecting children and adolescents on the
significant immediate and latent health risks that accompany early introductions
of tobacco use. See id. at 44,397-98.
10. See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. United States Food & Drug Admin., 966 F.
Supp. 1374 (M.D.N.C. 1997). As soon as the new FDA rules were released in pro-
posed form in the summer of 1995, the tobacco industry filed suit in federal dis-
trict court in North Carolina. Interestingly, the FDA previously had declined ju-
risdiction over cigarettes. See Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655 F. 2d
236 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
11. See 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e) (1994).
12. See Coyne Beahm, Inc., 966 F. Supp. at 1400 & n.33. The FDA claimed that
because 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e) granted it authority over the sale, distribution, and
use of tobacco products, it therefore could restrict the advertisement and promo-
tion of tobacco products pursuant to that section. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 1400.
15. See Saundra Torry, Duel in a Country Courthouse, With Tobacco Regulation at
[Vol. 23
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commercial speech decision in 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island,6 the FDA
regulations on tobacco advertising are essentially "dead on arrival."17 In
Part II, this Note traces the development of free speech and First
Amendment values. Part III frames the context in which the FDA regula-
tions will be analyzed by examining the evolution of the commercial
speech doctrine. Part IV evaluates the FDA regulations against commer-
cial speech standards and finds that the regulations would fail judicial
scrutiny. Alternatives to regulating tobacco advertising that could reduce
tobacco use and avoid constitutional challenges also are presented.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES OF FREE SPEECH
A. The History of the Free Speech Clause
Neither the history nor the text of the First Amendment provides ex-
plicit guidance about the intended meaning or breadth of the Free
Speech Clause.'8 Prior to the passage of the First Amendment in 1791,
free speech in the colonies mirrored the traditions of England by eschew-
ing prior restraints while allowing punishments for publication of sedi-
tious libel. 9 Even as prosecutions for seditious libel continued in the colo-
Stake, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 1997, at F7. University of Chicago law professor Cass
Sunstein predicts that "the 4th Circuit is very skeptical and will hold against the
FDA. Then we will have a real battle in the Supreme Court, and it's not easy to
predict what will happen there." Id. However, the Fourth Circuit recently upheld
sweeping bans on outdoor advertising of cigarettes and alcohol. See Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 63 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 116 S.
Ct. 1821, on remand, 101 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1569
(1997) (alcohol); Penn Advertising, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council, 63 F.3d 1318
(4th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2575, on remand, 101 F.3d 332
(4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997) (cigarettes). For a discussion of
these cases, see infra notes 280-288 and accompanying text.
16. 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (holding unconstitutional a state ban on liquor price
advertisements). For a detailed discussion of this case, see infra Part III.C.2.
17. See Ann Merrill, Lots of Money at Stake: What Do FDA Rules Mean for Adver-
tisers?, STAR TRm. (Minneapolis), Aug. 24, 1996, at A17 (quoting Minneapolis ad-
vertising law attorney Stephen Bergerson).
18. See ZECHARIAH CHAFFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (1941)
("The framers of the First Amendment make it plain that they regarded freedom
of speech as very important.... But they say very little about its exact meaning.");
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NowA, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 16.26, at 985 (5th ed. 1995); Robert H. Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 22 (1971) ("The fram-
ers seem to have had no coherent theory of free speech and appear not to have
been overly concerned with the subject."); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The
Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial Speech, 71 TEx. L. REv. 747, 749 (1993)
("The First Amendment poses a difficult practical problem: It is quite short and
does not explain what counts as 'speech,' what counts as 'freedom,' or what
counts as 'abridging.'").
19. See ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 18, § 16.3, at 987. Sedition occurs
1997]
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nies, popular opinion of these prosecutions waned following the prosecu-
tion and acquittal of New York publisher John Peter Zenger in 1735.20
Notwithstanding its growing unpopularity, the colonial common law of se-
ditious libel generally followed the Blackstonian theory of free speech,
which posited that speech deserved protections only from prior restraint
laws.
21
From the colonial period until the enactment of the First Amend-
ment, popular opinion was entirely inconsistent with Blackstone's narrow
conception of speech.2 The colonists favored defining free speech in a
liberal manner." Benjamin Franklin was an early champion of the belief
that expression should be left largely untouched by government regula-
24tion. Franklin wrote his most famous and influential essay on freedom of
the press in defense of a handbill he printed that contained derogatory
25comments about Anglican ministers. Franklin defended his actions, rely-
when criticism is leveled at the sovereign. See id. English courts developed the
theory that the King and his subjects were above questioning. See id. Anyone ex-
pressing disapproval of the sovereign or its agents was subject to criminal punish-
ment; truth was not a defense. See id.
20. See id. § 16.4, at 988-89. The prosecution of John Peter Zenger, a New
York publisher, for printing seditious material about New York's governor precipi-
tated disgust with sedition laws. See id. At the time of Zenger's prosecution, colo-
nialists were becoming resentful of English control. See id. Alexander Hamilton,
Zenger's lawyer, capitalized on this fact. See id. He recognized that a jury would
not convict Zenger for printing material critical of an agent of the King if the ma-
terial were deemed not false. See id. Zenger was acquitted of the charges, but the
fact that he was prosecuted for expressing opinions that were approved by many
caused many colonists to distrust sedition laws. See id.; see also CHAFFEE, supra note
18, at 20-21 (noting that colonial disapproval of the sedition laws grew following
Zenger's trial).
21. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 18, § 16.5, at 989 n.5 (noting that from
1760 to 1776 there were 70 prosecutions and 50 convictions for seditious libel in
the colonies); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 151-54 (1765-69), reprinted in LEONARD W. LEVY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
FROM ZENGER TOJEFFERSON 103-05 (1996).
22. See CHAFFEE, supra note 18, at 18. Benjamin Franklin adamantly favored
prohibiting government from hindering the expression of political opinions. See
id. The Continental Congress wrote that scrutiny of public officials was necessary
to ensure they did their jobs. See id. Thomas Jefferson's desire to strengthen re-
ligious freedoms reflected a general trend toward a government more tolerant of
divergent views. See id.
23. See id. But see ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 18, § 20.4, at 1112 (noting
that while many people were critical of the King and his royal governors, popu-
larly-elected legislators routinely enacted laws that punished people for criticizing
colonial policies).
24. See Benjamin Franklin, An Apology for Printers, PA. GAZETTE (Phila.), June
10, 1731, reprinted in LEvy, supra note 21, at 4-10.
25. SeeJEFFREYA. SMITH, PRINTERSAND PRESS FREEDOMS 117 (1988). Franklin's
Apology was a response to "a bit of levity directed at Anglican clergymen [that] ap-
peared in an advertising handbill he printed." Id.
[Vol. 23
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ing on a "marketplace of ideas" theory wherein all opinions should be ex-
pressed, truth overcomes error, and only vicious and immoral expression
warranted censorship. 26 Another colonial newspaperman, Daniel Fowle,
echoed Franklin's liberal attitude toward free speech by vowing to print
anything that was not "divisive, immoral, or scurrilous."2 7 Just as Franklin's
support of free speech arose in the context of a commercial advertise-
ment, Fowle's praise for free speech specifically identified commercial
28speech as protected expression.
The revolutionary foment against the laws of England suggests that
the Framers enacted the Free Speech Clause to rid the colonies of the
English common law of free speech and seditious libel. 29 Understandably,
the enactment of the Sedition Act" was met with resentment and seen as
invading the broad American notion of free speech. 1 James Madison, the
principal author of the First Amendment, decried the Sedition law, as did
Thomas Jefferson.2  Although the Supreme Court never addressed the
constitutionality of the Sedition Act, subsequent opinions demonstrate
that it violated First Amendment principals.1 In light of the attitudes and
popular thinking of the time, the Framers must have leaned toward pro-
tecting a broad variety of speech from government regulation."
26. See Franklin, supra note 24, at 4-6; see also SMITH, supra note 25, at 117.
27. This statement appeared in the first edition of the New Hampshire Gazette,
published by Daniel Fowle in 1756. Daniel Fowle, N.H. GAZETrE (1756), reprinted
in SMITH, supra note 25, at 49.
28. See id. Fowle pledged that his Gazette
would contain Extracts from the best Authors on Points of the most use-
ful Knowledge, moral, religious or political Essays, and other such Specu-
lations as may have a Tendency to improve the Mind, afford any Help to
Trade, Manufactures, Husbandry, and other useful Arts, and promote
the public Welfare in any respect.
Id.
29. See CHArEE, supra note 18, at 20 (stating that the First Amendment was
written by men who, after seeing the effects of sedition laws, intended "to wipe out
the common law of sedition").
30. Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596. The Act criminalized publication
of false, scandalous, and malicious writings against the government, or material
defending countries hostile to the United States. See id.
31. See CHAFFEE, supra note 18, at 27.
32. See SMITH, supra note 25, at 52, 84-85, 89-90; see alsoJames Madison, Con-
gressional Debates, Tuesday, August 18, 1789, reprinted in DANIEL A. FARBER &
SUZANNA SHERRY, A HIsToRY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 239 (1990) (discuss-
ing the fact thatJames Madison read the First Amendment liberally).
33. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
34. See CHAFFEE, supra note 18, at 16; see also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,
714 (1931) (observing that Blackstonian ideals of freedom from prior restraint
were not the only freedoms protected by the First Amendment).
1997]
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B. First Amendment Values
The Supreme Court continues to define the reach of First Amend-
ment protections. Some categories of speech fall outside the First
Amendment's protection altogether. 5 Categories of speech receiving no
protection include fighting words,6 obscenity,37 libel,m speech inciting vio-
lence,39 and speech that causes a panic. 4° The social value of the content
of these types of speech is considered negligible because the speech does
nothing to further truth and is outweighed by society's interests in order
and morality.4' Despite its communicative characteristics, such speech is
comparable to a noisy soundtrack that can be turned down.42
In other situations, speech must present a clear and present danger
to be abridged. 43 The danger must be immediate, however, because the
First Amendment seeks to facilitate a marketplace of ideas in which truth
prevails." Discussion, not suppression, is a First Amendment touchstone.4 '
35. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387-89 (1992) (explaining that
content discrimination is authorized "when the basis for the content discrimina-
tion consists entirely of the reason the entire class of speech is proscribable at is-
sue, but not when the content discrimination is based on viewpoints other than
the proscribable content").
36. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
37. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,23-24 (1973).
38. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 342-43 (1974).
39. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (per curiam).
40. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919).
41. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
42. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387-89 (1992).
43. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
44. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting). Justice Holmes wrote:
[T] he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas -
that the best test in truth is the power of the thought to get itself ac-
cepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.... I think
that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expres-
sion of opinions that we loathe and believe fraught with death, unless
they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and
pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save
the country.
Id.
45. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring). In Justice Brandeis' words,
[N] o danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, un-
less the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may be-
fall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to
expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by
the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not
enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression.
[Vol. 23
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Even an exhortation to perform an illegal act must advocate and incite
imminent lawless action that is likely to be realized for it to be sup-
pressed.46 Abridging speech based on its content, however offensive or
repugnant the message may be, offends the values the First Amendment
protects.4 Free speech embraces controversy; it does not avoid it.
48
The First Amendment allows government regulations to survive con-
stitutional scrutiny when they regulate noninformative aspects of speech.
These restrictions affect the time, place, and manner in which speech is
made rather than the content of the speech.49 Courts will uphold such re-
strictions if they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant or substantial
government interest and allow reasonable and ample alternative avenues
of communication.
Expressive activity manifests itself in countess forms. As a result, the
Supreme Court has written a number of opinions ascertaining the consti-
Id.
46. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam); cf Git-
low v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[E]very idea
is an incitement. It offers itself for belief, and if believed, it is acted on unless
some other belief outweighs it.... [T] he only meaning of free speech is that they
should be given their chance and have their way.").
47. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419-20 (1989) (holding that a law
prohibiting flag-burning violated the First Amendment); Hustler Magazine v. Fal-
well, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988) (holding that the First Amendment protected a car-
toon parody of Jerry Falwell committing incest with his mother in an outhouse);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (stating that the country
has "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public is-
sues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (reversing a convic-
tion for wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft"); United States v.
Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("If there is any
principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any
other it is the principle of free thought - not free thought for those who agree
with us but freedom for the thought we hate.").
48. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 408. Modern contentious issues to which First
Amendment protection extends include corporate political speech, see First Nat'l
Bank v. Belotti, 434 U.S. 765 (1978); campaign expenditures, see Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam); and publication of the names of rape victims, see
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
49. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (upholding
park department regulations that sought to limit the sound level of outdoor con-
certs); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986) (up-
holding zoning ordinances that restricted the location of establishments hosting
exotic dancing because of the increased blight and criminal problems associated
with such establishments); Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62-
63 & n.18 (1976) (upholding restrictions on the locations of adult movie theaters
because of their detrimental effects on the surrounding neighborhoods).
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tutionality of government regulations affecting speech in many forms. In
a string of opinions, the Supreme Court has articulated the protections
the First Amendment provides to commercial speech. The next Part of
this Note tracks the development of this commercial speech jurisprudence
and illustrates the analytical framework within which the Court will de-
termine the constitutionality of the FDA regulations that limit tobacco ad-
vertising.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
As made clear by the text of the First Amendment and the history
behind it, the Free Speech Clause is quite broad and does not exclude
commercial speech from its protection.5 The failure to distinguish the
value of commercial speech may have been because commercial industry
and advertising were far less widespread than they are today, as was the
perceived need to protect the public from commercial harms.52 Colonial
society probably did not consider distinguishing commercial speech from
other types of speech.5 -
Commercial speech takes many forms.54 According to the Supreme
Court, commercial speech is recognizable merely by using common
sense.5 Identifying the abridgment of commercial speech often is difficult
to detect.56 The subjectivity inherent in the Court's common-sense ap-
proach to identifying commercial speech warrants an examination of the
origins and development of commercial speech case law.
51. See supra Part II.A.
52. See Daniel L. Brenner & William L. Rivers, Mass Media Law: An Overview,
in FREE BUT REGULATED: CONFLICTING TRADITIONS IN MEDIA LAw 3, 4 (Daniel L.
Brenner & William L. Rivers eds., 1982).
53. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech ?, 76
VA. L. REv. 627, 634 (1990) ("The [F]irst [A]mendment's text and history don't
provide us with any explanation of the distinction between commercial and non-
commercial speech.").
54. See Ronald KL. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce & Communication,
71 TEx. L. REv. 697, 700-19 (1993). The authors describe how advertisements
have evolved from conveying information to persuading with lifestyle images that
typically do not explicitly invite the consumer to buy. Examples include infomer-
cials, documercials, commercial video news releases, product placements, and ad-
vertorials, as well as traditional ads. See id. at 719.
55. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376, 385 (1973) ("There are commonsense differences between speech that
does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction.'").
56. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 53, at 631 (discussing the difficulty of
predicting which types of commercial speech receive protection, from direct-mail
contraceptive ads, which are protected, to Tupperware parties in college dorms,
which may not be protected).
[Vol. 23
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A. The Origination and Early Development of Commercial Speech
Jurisprudence
1. Valentine v. Chrestensen
The doctrine of commercial speech first appeared in Valentine v.
Chrestensen in 1942. 57 Chrestensen printed a handbill advertising tours of a
decommissioned Navy submarine, which he wanted to display to the pub-
lic for profit."' Upon distributing his handbill, Chrestensen was told by
the New York City police that he violated the city's sanitary code, which
forbade distributing commercial advertising matter in the city streets.
5 9
The code, however, did not prohibit the distribution of handbills that
conveyed simple information or encouraged public protest.60 To circum-
vent the code, Chrestensen printed a double-sided handbill with his origi-
nal advertisement on one side without a fee statement, and a protest
against the city dock department on the other side. 61 The police neverthe-
less arrested Chrestensen for violating the sanitary code; Chrestensen as-
serted that the code violated the First Amendment.
62
The Supreme Court purported to recognize the First Amendment is-
sue when analyzing the legality of the sanitary code.63 Justice Roberts nev-
ertheless reframed the Court's inquiry to determine the proper use of
municipal highways while silencing Chrestensen because of his bad-faith
attempt to evade the sanitary code. 4 Citing no authority, the Valentine
Court concluded that it was "clear that the Constitution imposes no such
restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising."o The
57. 316 U.S. 920 (1942).
58. Id.
59. Id. This ordinance later was held unconstitutional in People v. Remeny,
355 N.E.2d 375, 377 (N.Y. 1976).
60. Valentine, 316 U.S. at 921.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. Justice Roberts stated that "[t]he question is whether the application
of the ordinance to the respondent's activities was, in the circumstances, an un-
constitutional abridgment of the freedom of the press and of speech." Id.
64. Id. The Court noted that the court below, which held for Chrestensen,
validated the importance of speech no matter whether its subject concerns public
interest or private profit because of the difficulty of separating the two. Id. The
Court nonetheless refrained from discussing the First Amendment implications of
the issue before it. See id.
65. Id.; see EDWIN P. RoME & WILLIAM H. ROBERTS, CORPORATE AND
COMMERCIAL FREE SPEECH 12-14 (1985). The holding may have been presaged by
dicta in Schneider v. New Jersey, which involved the distribution of religious material
by a Jehovah's Witness who also solicited cash contributions. 308 U.S. 147, 165
(1939). The Schneider Court invalidated a New Jersey statute prohibiting such so-
licitations because of the religious motivation of the Jehovah's Witness. Id. It im-
1997]
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brief, puzzling opinion may have been the result of the prevailing societal
attitude that advertising was a business subject to regulation rather than a
form of free expression.6 Apparently without even realizing the far-
reaching implications the decision would have, the Court in Valentine ex-
67cepted commercial speech from First Amendment protection.
2. Breard v. Alexandria
The Supreme Court next dealt with commercial speech in 1951 in
68Breard v. Alexandria. In Breard, a magazine salesman selling subscriptions
door-to-door was arrested for violating an Alexandria city ordinance that
required commercial solicitors to get permission from homeowners before
soliciting orders.' The Court upheld his conviction on the ground that a
homeowner's private interest in being free from solicitors outweighed the
right to solicit.70 The Breard Court, like the Valentine Court, did not at-
tempt to divine the speaker's motivation] Instead, it acknowledged
Breard's commercial conduct and balanced that interest against the pri-
vacy interests of homeowners. 72 The result of Breard differed little from
plied that if the case had involved a profit motive the ordinance might have been
upheld. See id.; ROME & ROBERTS, supra, at 14. The Court of Appeals acknowl-
edged that this approach had merit, but it rejected as futile any attempt to divine
the primary motivation of mixed commercial/noncommercial messages. See Val-
entine v. Chrestensen, 122 F.2d. 511, 514-15 (2d Cir. 1941).
66. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 18, at 758. The authors suggest that
Valentine's language is more suggestive of the substantive due process approach
typical of the Court at that time. See id. at 758-59 (stating that "whether, and to
what extent, one may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the streets, to
what extent such activity shall be adjudged a derogation of the public right of a
user, are matters for legislative judgment").
67. See id. Attesting to the low level of attention and importance the Court
gave the Valentine case was the short time in which it was decided (13 days) and
the complete absence of documentation regarding the case in the Court's own
files. See id.
68. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
69. Id. at 623.
70. Id. at 644-45.
71. Id.; cf. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111-12 (1943) (reversing
soliciting convictions ofJehovah's Witnesses; holding that even though conduct of
selling religious books door-to-door appeared commercial, the commercial ele-
ment was merely incidental to the dissemination of religious beliefs, which was
protected by the Free Exercise Clause).
72. See Breard, 341 U.S. at 644-45. The Court distinguished Martin v. City of
Struthers, in which free distribution of religious materials door-to-door had no
commercial element deserving less rigorous First Amendment scrutiny. See 319
U.S. 141, 142 n.1 (1943), cited in Breard, 341 U.S. at 642-43; see also Florida Bar v.
Went For It, 515 U.S. 618, 625 (1995) (upholding Florida bar's ban on lawyers'
direct-mail solicitation of personal injury or wrongful death clients within 30 days
of accident because of substantial interest in protecting the privacy interest of vic-
tims and their families).
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that of Valentine. But because it acknowledged that solicitors maintained
an interest in distributing information, even though that interest was out-
weighed, the Breard opinion foreshadowed the later disavowal of Valen-
73tine.
B. Contemporary Commercial Speech Jurisprudence
1. Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell
Although broadcasting cases are distinguishable from pure commer-
cial speech cases, 74 Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell is instructive both in
its facts and its treatment of cigarette advertising.75 Six radio stations sued
to enjoin enforcement of a provision of the Public Health Cigarette Smok-
ing Act of 1969, which prohibited the broadcasting of cigarette advertise-
ments.76 The district court declared cigarette advertising on radio and
television to be a legitimate "evil at hand" subject to rational congressional
action." The district court pointed to evidence of television and radio ad-
78
vertising's detrimental persuasive effect on young people. In upholding
the statute, the court also declared that the broadcasters themselves had
not lost any right to speak; they had lost only the ability to collect revenue
from the tobacco ads. 79 The Supreme Court, without writing an opinion,
upheld the complete statutory ban on radio and television cigarette adver-
tusing.8 0
73. See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (dismissing the Valentine decision as "casual, almost offhand. And it
has not survived reflection"); see also Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298, 314 n.6 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that there was "some doubt
concerning whether the commercial speech distinction announced in Valentine v.
Chrestensen... retains continuing constitutional validity").
74. Broadcasters are subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission. See Bruce M. Owen, Different Media, Differing Treatment: Radio
and Television, in FREE BUT REGULATED, supra note 52, at 35 (discussing broadcast-
ing's unique status in free speech discourse because broadcasters must receive
FCC licensing prior to broadcasting, whereas prior restraint of speech is, in gen-
eral, diametrically opposed to First Amendment values).
75. 333 F. Supp. 582, 583-86 (D.C. Cir. 1971), affd sub nom. Capitol Broad.
Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972) (mem.). The tobacco companies were
notably absent from this lawsuit. See id.
76. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970) (amended 1973) ("[I]t shall be unlawful to ad-
vertise cigarettes on any medium of electronic communication subject to the ju-
risdiction of the Federal Communications Commission.").
77. Capitol Broadcasting, 333 F. Supp. at 585.
78. Id. at 586. The district court noted thatJoseph Cullman, then chairman
of Philip Morris, did not dispute the propriety of banning the cigarette ads while
allowing them to remain in print where adults could access them and where chil-
dren were less likely to do so. Id. at n.13.
79. Id. at 584.
80. See Capitol Broad. Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972) (mem.), affg
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The decision created controversy over the extent of government's
power to abridge speech that it deemed harmful to the public.8' In his
dissent to the court of appeals' opinion, Judge Wright criticized the deci-
sion as affirming a "legislative coup" by the tobacco industry.82 Judge
Wright characterized the industry's purported altruism in acceding to the
congressional ban as a ploy to further its own self-interest, because the ban
extended to anti- as well as pro-cigarette ads. 83 Anti-smoking ads had
84proven very effective in reducing cigarette consumption and revenue.
Once the anti-smoking ads were gone, cigarette consumption immediately
increased.' Judge Wright blamed the increase in smoking on the absence
of debate fostered by allowing both pro- and anti-smoking ads on the air-
86waves.
2. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations
In the following years, the Supreme Court mollified concerns about
government restrictions of commercial speech, starting in 1973 with Pitts-
burgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations.8 7 Pittsburgh Press
Capitol Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
81. See ROTUNDA & NOWA, supra note 18, § 16.31, at 1068 (characterizing the
Capitol Broadcasting decision as "troublesome" because of the cursory treatment
the court gave to First Amendment concerns).
82. Capitol Broadcasting, 333 F. Supp. at 589 (Wright, J., dissenting). Judge
Wright coined the phrase "commercial speech" in Business Executives Move for Viet-
nam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 658 n.38 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
83. Capitol Broadcasting, 333 F. Supp. at 587-88 (Wright, J., dissenting). The
cigarette companies themselves suggested the ads be pulled. In return for this
"voluntary altruism," the tobacco industry received a delay in pending FTC action
against tobacco advertising as well as a prohibition on state regulations of ciga-
rette advertising and packaging that would be stricter than those established by
federal law. Id. at 589; see also Banzhafv. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1092-93 (1968) (de-
claring cigarette advertising to be controversial speech subject to the fairness doc-
trine, requiring any station carrying cigarette ads to carry approximately the same
number of anti-smoking ads).
84. See Capitol Broadcasting, 333 F. Supp. at 587 (Wright., J., dissenting).
85. See id. at 589; see also MICHAEL G. GARTNER, ADvERTISING AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 30-33 (1989) (agreeing with Judge Wright's reasoning and proposing
that tobacco ads be allowed back on the air with the government buying advertis-
ing time for anti-smoking ads).
86. Capitol Broadcasting, 333 F. Supp. at 590, 594 (Wright, J., dissenting)
("[T]he effect of this legislation was to cut off debate on the value of cigarettes
just when Banzhaf had made such a debate a real possibility.... I think that when
people are given both sides of the cigarette controversy, they will make the correct
decision. That, after all, is what the First Amendment is all about.").
87. 413 U.S. 376 (1973); see also Kozinski & Banner, supra note 18, at 756
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involved a Pittsburgh ordinance that prohibited hiring on the basis of
sex." Thousands of newspaper classified employment ads, however, were
categorized on the basis of sex. 9 The National Organization for Women
filed a complaint with the commission charged with enforcing the ordi-
90nance.
The Court found that the advertisements at issue were "classic exam-
ple[s] of commercial speech." 9' It declined to strip the ads of First
Amendment protection and even suggested that the interests in commer-
cial speech could outweigh the government interest in suppressing the
commercial message. The Court held that the ads could be banned,
however, because the advertisements advanced activity that was itself ille-
gal.9 The Pittsburgh Press Court's holding was significant because it dem-
onstrated that speech that is profit-driven or that merely proposes a com-
mercial transaction is not without First Amendment protection.
3. Bigelow v. Virginia
In the 1975 case of Bigelow v. Virginia,9 the Court confirmed that ad-
vertising deserves some level of First Amendment protection, thereby con-
tinuing to distance itself from the Valentine holding. In Bigelow, a newspa-
per editor was prosecuted for violating a Virginia law that prohibited
advertisements relating to abortion services. Relying on the Valentine
opinion, the Virginia Supreme Court disagreed with Bigelow's contention
that the prosecution violated the First Amendment, reasoning that com-
mercial advertisements were not protected by the First Amendment.
97
The Bigelow Court characterized the Valentine holding as distinctly
limited and not designed to put commercial speech outside First Amend-. 98
ment protection. It reversed the newspaper editor's conviction after bal-
ancing various state interests in prohibiting the advertisements against the
audience's interest in receiving the message. 99 Specifically, the Court held
88. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 378.
89. Id. at 378-79. The advertisements at issue were grouped according to
"Male Help Wanted," "Female Help Wanted," "Male-Female Help Wanted," "Jobs
- Male Interest," and "Jobs - Female Interest." Id. at 379.
90. Id. at 379.
91. Id. at 385.
92. Id. at 388-89.
93. Id. at 388.
94. See id. at 385.
95. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
96. Id. The law stated, "'If any person, by... advertisement, encourage[s] or
prompt[s] the procurement of abortion or miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.'" Id. at 812 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (1966)).
97. Id. at 818 (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 191 S.E.2d 173 (Va. 1972)).
98. Id. at 819-20.
99. Id. at 826-29. The Court stressed that
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that the First Amendment protected the advertisement because of its in-
terest and value to its audience, which consisted of those needing abortion
services and those interested in the development of abortion law.ln Fi-
nally, the Court concluded that the advertisement deserved protection be-
cause it pertained to an activity that was not only legal but constitutional.10'
The decision further narrowed the Valentine opinion's authority. Yet, be-
cause the subject matter of the message related to abortion, a constitu-
tionally protected activity, Bigelow did not squarely address the commercial
speech conundrum respecting the regulations of advertisements relating
to activities that are not constitutionally protected.""
4. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc.
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the First Amend-
ment protects commercial speech that relates to activities the government
can regulate or prohibit.'3 In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court considered the
constitutionality of a law prohibiting licensed pharmacists from advertising
the prices of prescription drugs. The facts of this case are unique be-
cause the speech recipients, the consumers, rather than the speaker,
brought suit.
0 5
In considering the First Amendment implications of the law, the
Court confirmed the importance of protecting the content of -truthful
commercial speech that relates to lawful activity because of the public in-
terest in receiving information. 1 6 It stressed that protecting purely com-
[t]o the extent that commercial activity is subject to regulation, the rela-
tionship of speech to that activity may be one factor, among others, to be
considered in weighing the First Amendment interest against the gov-
ernmental interest alleged. Advertising is not thereby stripped of all
First Amendment protection. The relationship of speech to the market-
place of products or of services does not make it valueless in the market-
place of ideas.
Id. at 826.
100. Id. at 822.
101. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 821-22. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
102. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 825.
103. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
104. Id. at 750-51. The statute at issue provided that a licensed pharmacist was
guilty of unprofessional conduct if the pharmacist "publishes, advertises or pro-
motes, directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, any amount, price, fee
premium, discount, rebate or credit terms... for any drugs which may be dis-
pensed only by prescription." Id. at 750 n.2.
105. See id. at 757. The pharmacists had lost a previous suit and did not ap-
peal. See id. at 753.
106. Id. at 762-63.
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mercial speech did not offend the First Amendment values that shield
paid advertisements, movies, and books - all of which contribute to public
debate on ideas - from unrestricted government regulation.10 7 Further,
the Court stressed that the First Amendment protects both the right to
speak and the right to receive information,'10 and it noted that, at times,
the public's interest in receiving commercial information may be greater
than its interest in political speech.1 9
Although it found the law invalid, the Virginia Pharmacy Court con-
ceded that some commercial speech may be regulated with respect to the
time, place, and manner in which it is made." ° The Court reasoned that
commercial speech is subject to regulation because "commonsense differ-
ences" distinguish it from other forms of speech."' It cautioned that its
opinion should not be read to suggest that all commercial speech could
be regulated with impunity; rather, the regulation of false, deceptive, or
misleading speech would be allowed to ensure the flow of truthful and le-
gitimate commercial information.1 2 The Virginia Pharmacy opinion re-
flected the Court's rejection of the paternalistic view that governments
should decide what is best for the public in favor of "assum [ing] that...
information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own
best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best
means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than
to close them.".. 3
5. The Central Hudson Test
In the wake of the foregoing opinions, the Court established a test
for determining the constitutionality of regulations affecting commercial
speech in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of
New York.14 The four-prong test requires the reviewing court to consider:
107. Id. at 761-62.
108. Id. at 756-57.
109. Id. at 763.
110. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771.
111. Id. at n.24 (noting that commercial speech was "more easily verifiable by
its disseminator than... news reporting or political commentary" because adver-
tising disseminators have firsthand knowledge of the facts about their product).
112. Id. at 771; see also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 366 (1977)
(holding that a state may restrict certain aggressive sales practices that could exert
undue influence over consumers).
113. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770. The Court concluded that "the choice
among these alternative approaches is not ours to make or the Virginia General
Assembly's. It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing
information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First
Amendment makes for us." Id. The notion is reminiscent of Judge Wright's dis-
sent in Capitol Broadcasting. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
114. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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(1) whether the commercial speech relates to lawful activity and is not
misleading; (2) whether the governmental interest is substantial; (3)
whether the regulation that suppresses speech directly advances the gov-
ernmental interest claimed; and (4) whether the regulation that sup-
presses speech is no more extensive than necessary in order to serve the
governmental interest."" If the speech promotes illegal activity, or is false
or misleading, it receives no First Amendment protection and the Central
Hudson inquiry ends. If the speech promotes a legal activity and is not
false or misleading, it has presumptive First Amendment protection and
the remaining elements must be examined.16 If the restrictions do not
satisfy each of the remaining three elements, they violate the First
Amendment."7
In Central Hudson, the New York Public Services Commission prohib-
ited promotional advertising by a New York electrical utility company.118
The commission reasoned that banning the advertising would decrease
energy demand and facilitate conservation." 9 The Court found the adver-
tisements to be neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity; conse-
quently, the advertisements satisfied the first prong of Central Hudson and,
therefore, received presumptive First Amendment protection. 2 " Proceed-
ing to the second prong, the Court acknowledged the substantial govern-
ment interest in energy conservation. 2' It further found that the third
prong was satisfied because the commission could show a direct relation-
ship between advertising and the consumption of energy;2 2 however, the
prohibition failed the fourth prong because it was more extensive than
necessary to further the state's interest in conserving energy.' 2 In the
Court's view, the Commission had not demonstrated that a regulation less
restrictive than a complete advertising ban would not have reduced energy
consumption as much as the regulation it employed - a kind of least re-
strictive means analysis.12  The Court's opinion expressed a general
scheme of analyzing commercial speech regulations to allow regulation of
false and misleading speech while preventing the highly paternalistic,
broad government regulation that can displace vigorous debate.




119. Id. at 559-60.
120. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 567-68.
121. Id. at 568-69 (1980).
122. Id. at 569.
123. Id. at 569-70.
124. Id. at 570-71. The Court subsequently softened the impact of the fourth
prong of Central Hudson by adopting "something short of a least-restrictive means
standard." Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989).
125. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9.
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C. Recent Applications of the Central Hudson Test
The Supreme Court's application of the Central Hudson test often has
appeared inconsistent. For example, the Court has upheld prohibitions
on gambling ads, 126 radio lottery ads,127 and attorney direct-mail advertis-
ing.128  Conversely, the Court has struck down bans on residential "For
Sale" signs,1 29 news racks dispensing commercial handbills,'30 and in-person
soliciting by Florida accountants." The cases upholding commercial
speech bans illustrate that the Court sometimes will defer to legislative
pronouncements. 32  The Court's recent commercial speech decisions,
however, signal a shift toward the highest level of protection commercial
speech ever has enjoyed."
1. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.
In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., the Coors Company sought to have de-
clared unconstitutional a subsection of the Federal Alcohol Administra-
tion Act (FAAA) that prohibited beer labels from displaying alcohol con-
tent.TM Both parties and the lower courts agreed that the information at
126. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 348
(1986) (upholding a Puerto Rican law prohibiting gambling advertisements de-
spite the fact that gambling is legal in Puerto Rico).
127. See United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 435-36 (1993) (up-
holding a federal statute prohibiting the broadcast of lottery advertisements in
states where lotteries are illegal, while permitting such advertisements in states
that do have lotteries).
128. SeeFlorida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 634-35 (1995) (justifying
restrictions on lawyer advertising by noting that the state had a very strong interest
in protecting accident victims and in salvaging the public's confidence in lawyers).
129. See Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97-98
(1977) (reasoning that the municipality's interest in preventing "panic selling"
could not outweigh citizens' interests in determining where they should live).
130. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 430 (1993)
(finding that the city could not justify prohibiting news racks devoted to commer-
cial advertising while allowing other news racks).
131. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (reasoning that accountants,
unlike lawyers, were not trained in the art of persuasion and dealt with more savvy
clients).
132. See, e.g., Metromedia v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507-08 (1981)
(deferring to legislative judgment on traffic safety and aesthetics in upholding
ban on outdoor billboards).
133. See 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (striking down
ban on alcohol price advertising); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476
(1995) (striking down ban on alcohol content on beer labels); David G. Savage,
The Shifting Sands of Free Speech: As Private Interests Enlist Constitutional Protection,
'Liberal' Support Wanes, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1996, at 42, 44 (quoting Burt Neuborne of
New York University School of Law, who stated that the current Court was "the
fiercest defender of the First Amendment in the Court's history").
134. 514 U.S. at 478-79 (citing 27 U.S.C. § 205(e) (2) (1994)).
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issue was truthful and nonmisleading and, therefore, in compliance with
the first prong of the Central Hudson test. 5" In a 1995 decision, the Su-
preme Court found that the regulations satisfied the second prong of Cen-
tral Hudson because the state demonstrated that it had a substantial inter-
est in banning alcohol content to prevent brewers from competing on the
basis of alcohol content. 13
In the Court's view, however, the restriction failed the necessary fit
between regulation and government interest mandated by the final two
prongs of the Central Hudson test.'37 The Court confirmed that the Central
Hudson factor requiring the regulation to directly advance the government
interest must accomplish a direct and material degree of advancement
against actual harms rather than a speculative advancement 3  The alco-
hol content ban prohibited the publication of alcoholic content on beer
labels while concomitantly requiring such labeling on wine and liquor la-
bels; the regulation also allowed brewers to indicate the strength of the
brew by labeling their brew as malt liquor.139 These inconsistencies led the
Court to find that the regulation did not directly advance the government
interest in curbing competition based on alcohol content, or "strength
wars.
-14°
Rubin's sharp focus on the regulation's inability to advance the gov-
ernment interest revealed that the Court was becoming increasingly reluc-
tant to defer to legislative and executive judgments about regulating
commercial speech. Justice John Paul Stevens, concurring in the judg-
ment, urged that strict scrutiny be applied to any content-based abridg-
ment.1
2. 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island
In 1996, the Court continued the trend toward more protection for
commercial speech in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island.4 1 In 44 Liquor-
mart, the Court examined two Rhode Island statutes that prohibited alco-
holic beverage advertisements from making any reference to price except
for price tags or signs within the premises. 4 3 The plaintiff, 44 Liquormart,
a licensed retailer of alcoholic beverages, placed an advertisement that did
not mention the prices of its alcoholic beverages and even stated that state
135. See id. at 483.
136. Id. at 485.
137. Id. at 486, 490-91.
138. Id. at 486-87; see also Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993).
139. See Rubin, 514 U.S. at 488-89.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 496-97 (StevensJ, concurring).
142. 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
143. Id. at 1501.
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law prohibited such practice. T4 Complaints from competitors, however,
led the state to prosecute the store because its ad purportedly suggested
that 44 Liquormart had low prices.1
45
The 44 Liquormart opinion reveals a significant shift in the Court's
analysis of regulations affecting commercial speech. First, the Court clari-
fied the application of the four-prong Central Hudson inquiry by announc-
ing the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny for challenged commercial
speech abridgments. Regulations that attempt to protect consumers
from false, misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales tactics or that require
disclosure of additional, beneficial consumer information deserve less
than strict scrutiny. 47 When the attempted abridgment of commercial
speech is a blanket ban on truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages,
then strict scrutiny applies.'4 Accordingly, the Court applied the Central
Hudson test, knowing that few regulations survive this heightened scru-
tiny. 9 The Court acknowledged that deference to legislative decisions is
appropriate in certain circumstances, but it suggested that such circum-
stances would be very limited.1 uo
Second, 44 Liquormart erased any notion that there was a vice excep-
tion to First Amendment protection.' The Court stated that countless
activities could be defined as vice.'52 Moreover, legislative bodies could
justify regulations of commercial speech simply by labeling the undesir-
able activity being advertised as vice. 53 Hence, the Court repudiated the
notion that simply because governments possess the potential to regulate
or even prohibit an activity, they may prohibit or ban commercial speech
relating to the activity.5 4 In other words, the power to ban an activity that
is unprotected by the First Amendment mean that speech concerning the
activity loses First Amendment protection. 155
Third, the Court rejected the idea that a common-sense link exists
144. See id. at 1503.
145. See id. The ads stated the low prices of condiments and mixers and in-
cluded the word "WOW" in large print next to pictures of rum and vodka bottles,
thereby insinuating low prices. See id.
146. Id. at 1507.
147. Id. at 1506.
148. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1506-07; cf. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,
515 U.S. 618, 623-24 (1995) (holding that intermediate scrutiny applies to com-
mercial speech cases).
149. 44Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1508.
150. See id. at 1511; see also Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S.
490, 507-08 (1981) (deferring to legislative decision to ban commercial billboards
for reasons of traffic safety and aesthetics).
151. See 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1513-14.
152. Id. at 1513.
153. Id.
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between advertising and demand.5 6 Though the Court found it entirely
plausible that advertisements identifying the alcohol content of beverages
might increase sales and consumption, it emphasized that the state
needed to produce credible evidence establishing a significant causative
link.'57
Fourth, the fractured unanimity of the 44 Liquormart plurality, which
generated four opinions, demonstrated the Court's disaffection with the
Central Hudson test itself. Three of the four opinions focused on a sepa-
rate element of the four-part Central Hudson test as being dispositive when
considering the constitutionality of regulations limiting commercial
speech. Justice Stevens posited that only false and misleading speech
should be subjected to regulation.'5 Justice Thomas would do away with
the Central Hudson test altogether when the government's purported in-
terest is to manipulate consumers' choices to purchase products or serv-
ices that are not illegal.'59 Justice O'Connor hinted that determining
whether the regulations are more extensive than necessary to meet the
government's purported interest is the pivotal consideration in applying
the Central Hudson test.' 6° Justice Scalia complained that the Central Hud-
son test is inadequate because it is based merely on policy intuitions, but
he did not suggest an alternative. 6' The fallout from all of the opinions
calls into question whether the Court will continue to use the Central Hud-
son test. 62 One thing is clear: The 44 Liquormart decision illustrates that




156. Id. at 1509.
157. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1509.
158. Id. at 1507. Justice Stevens based much of his opinion on ensuring a fair
bargaining process between sellers and consumers. See id. This is consistent with
his application of the Central Hudson test in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993) (warning against underestimating the value of
commercial speech by drawing bright lines to define it), and in his concurrence
to Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491-98 (arguing that harm to consum-
ers rests only in the falsity or misleading nature of the speech).
159. See 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1518 n.5 (Thomas,J., concurring). Justice
Thomas went further than Stevens, stating that he would not have applied the
Central Hudson test even to the facts of Central Hudson itself. See id.
160. Id. at 1521 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
161. Id. at 1515 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
162. Justice Scalia's concurrence suggested that given the proper "where-
withal," the Court could declare what ought to replace the test. Id. (Scalia, J.,
concurring). In addition, Justice Thomas claimed that Justices Stevens and
O'Connor took a position that "go[es] a long way toward the position I take." Id.
at 1518-19 (Thomas, J., concurring).
163. See David 0. Stewart, Change Brewing in Commercial Speech: Decision Signals
Shift Toward Greater First Amendment Protection, A.B.A. J., July 1996, at 44 (asserting
that the 44 Liquormart decision "deliver[ed] a solid blow in favor of increasing
First Amendment protections for commercial speech").
[Vol. 23
22
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol23/iss3/6
TOBACCO TALK
3. Summary of Current Supreme Court Commercial Speech
Juisprudence
Since the Valentine decision, the commercial nature of speech has not
disqualified it from First Amendment protection.M Speech should not be
restricted simply because it is made in the context of advertising. 1 5 The
cases leading up to and including 44 Liquormart reveal that speech restric-
tions that keep consumers "in the dark for what the government perceives
to be their own good" will be met with great skepticism.'66 With the
heightened scrutiny 44 Liquormart prescribes, the constitutionality of regu-
lations that amount to a complete ban on commercial speech, to a great
extent turns on the simple consideration of whether such regulations re-
late to an illegal activity167 or relate to speech that is false or misleading.
M
If the Supreme Court adheres to the stance it took in 44 Liquormart, it will
be very difficult for the proposed FDA regulations on tobacco advertising
to withstand Court scrutiny.
IV. FDA TOBACCO ADVERTISING REGULATIONS:
FAILING THE CENTRAL HUDSONTEST
A. The Proposed Regulations
Despite the current Court's inclination toward reviewing commercial
speech regulations with rigorous scrutiny, the FDA promulgated sweeping
advertisement restrictions directed at reducing tobacco use among chil-
dren and adolescents.69 The regulations aim at four principal areas of to-
164. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825 (1975).
165. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976). The Supreme Court reasoned:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is
nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and
selling what product, for what reason, and at what price. So long as we
preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our
resources in large measure will be made through numerous private eco-
nomic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in
the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free
flow of commercial information is indispensable.
Id.
166. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1508 (1996); see also
id. at 1518 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that if government regulation at-
tempts to keep the public in the dark under the Central Hudson balancing ap-
proach, that test should be abandoned in favor of strict scrutiny).
167. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n of Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376, 388-89 (1973).
168. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771; see also Friedman v. Rogers, 440
U.S. 1, 13, 15-16 (1979).
169. See FDA Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes
and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396
19971
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bacco advertisement and distribution. First, the regulations circumscribe
the conditions of manufacture, sale, and distribution of tobacco prod-
ucts.7 Second, they require a statement of intended use and age restric-
tion on cigarette or smokeless tobacco packages.' 7 ' Third, the regulations
detail the scope of permissible forms of labeling and advertising.
7 2
Fourth, they set the format and content requirements for labeling and ad-
vertising.7  Finally, the regulations restrict the sale and distribution of
non-tobacco items and services, gifts, and sponsorships of events.74
The rules proscribe free samples, as well as vending machines and
self-service displays in facilities to which minors are admitted. 75 They also
eliminate outdoor billboard advertising of tobacco products within 1000
feet of schools, parks, or playgrounds. 76 Labeling and advertising are re-
stricted to black text on white background unless: 1) the advertising is in
a publication demonstrated by the manufacturer or advertiser to be an
adult publication, or 2) the advertising is in a facility where minors are not
allowed and the advertisement is not visible from outside the facility. 77
Manufacturers also are forbidden from marketing, licensing, distributing,
or selling any item, service, or gifts other than cigarettes or smokeless to-
bacco that bears "any... indicia of product identification identical or
similar to, or identifiable with, those used for any brand of cigarettes or
smokeless tobacco."78 Similarly, tobacco companies are forbidden from
sponsoring any event in the name of any tobacco product.1
In practical terms, the FDA claims that these regulations are content-
neutral and merely involve restricting the time, place, and manner of ad-
vertising.
8 0
The tobacco advertisements that the FDA seeks to restrict are profit-
(1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, 897). The regula-
tions affect cigarettes, cigarette tobacco, and smokeless tobacco as defined in
Food and Drugs, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,616 (1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.3).
170. Food and Drugs, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,616, 44,616-17 (1996) (to be codified at
21 C.F.R. § 897.16).
171. Id. at 44,617 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.25).
172. Id. (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.30).
173. Id. (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.32).
174. Id. at 44,617-18 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.34).
175. Id. at 44,617 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.16(c)-(d)).
176. Food and Drugs, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,616, 44,617 (1996) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. § 897.30(a)-(b)).
177. Id. (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.32(a)).
178. Id. (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.34(a)). This regulation would pro-
hibit common forms of cigarette advertising such as hats and T-shirts bearing
cigarette brand logos, and contests sponsored by cigarette companies. Id. at
44,617-18 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.34(b)).
179. Id. at 44,618 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.34(c)). These restrictions
would affect events such as the Winston Cup Series of automobile races and the
Virginia Slims tennis tournaments. See id.
180. See Food and Drugs, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,470, 44,470 (1996).
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driven and propose commercial transactions.1s' Thus, tobacco ads are
clearly a form of commercial speech and, therefore, would be reviewed
under the Central Hudson test.' As this Note demonstrates next, these
regulations restrict tobacco advertising to such an extent that they would
be invalidated under a First Amendment challenge.
B. Applying the Central Hudson Test to FDA Tobacco Advertising
Regulations
In applying the Central Hudson test, the Court first will determine
whether the tobacco advertisements enjoy First Amendment protection.!"2
The ads must be truthful and nonmisleading to satisfy this prong. 84 Ana-
lyzing the regulations under the second prong requires that the FDA show
that curtailing tobacco advertising promotes the substantial government
interest of protecting children."' 5 If the government interest in restricting
such advertising is not substantial, then the analysis is over and the regula-
tions will not stand. To satisfy the third prong, the FDA regulations must
be shown to advance directly the substantial government interest.8 6 If
they do, the fourth and last prong requires that the restrictions be no
more extensive than necessary to achieve the goal of protecting children.
The rigor with which the Court applies the Central Hudson test de-
pends on whether the regulations amount to a blanket ban on truthful,
nonmisleading commercial speech rather than constitutionally permissi-
ble time, place, and manner restrictions. 1 7 The heightened level of scru-
tiny that is applied in the former scenario particularly applies to the third
and fourth prongs of the test, where the evaluation is whether the regula-
tion directly advances the state's interest and is no more extensive than
necessary to achieve that interest.88
1. The First Prong: Legality and Veracity
The first prong of the Central Hudson test includes two elements:
whether the tobacco ads relate to lawful activity and whether they are
truthful and not misleading. 88 If the advertisements fail this prong, they
181. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 416
U.S. 376, 385 (1973).
182. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980); Pittsburgh Press, 416 U.S. at 385.




187. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1507-08 (1996).
188. See id. at 1508-09.
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receive no First Amendment protection.'9 The FDA has argued that this
is the case with tobacco advertisements. 91
a. Legality
The FDA does not seriously dispute that tobacco consumption is le-
gal for anyone over eighteen years of age. The major thrust prompting
the enactment of the regulations is to reduce minors' consumption of
cigarettes, which is an illegal activity in every state.' 92 The FDA asserts that
because tobacco advertisements reach minors, even if the ads are not con-
strued to be pure proposals to sell, the ads encourage tobacco use and,
thus, are sufficiently "related to illegal activity" not to be protected by the
First Amendment."93
Because the 44 Liquormart Court rejected the notion that advertise-
ments could be regulated simply because the activities they promote were
subject to regulation, 94 the FDA cannot rely on the government's ostensi-
ble power to ban tobacco products outright as a basis for restricting to-
bacco advertisements. Indeed, the FDA explains it does not seek to ban
tobacco products per se because of the harsh withdrawal effects to present
smokers and the likelihood of black market sales of even more dangerous
products. 9 ' The lessons of alcohol prohibition also counsel against such
action. Rather, the FDA asserts that tobacco advertising's relationship to
illegal underage smoking might cause it to fall outside the protection of
the First Amendment. 1
96
The fact that tobacco products are legal for adults undercuts the
forcefulness of the FDA's reasoning. The FDA acknowledges that even
though a type of commercial speech may relate to activity that is illegal
under state law, that does not remove the constitutional protection from
the advertising of an otherwise lawful product to adults.' 97 It nevertheless
190. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 416
U.S. 376, 388-89 (1973).
191. See Food and Drugs, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,471 (1996).
192. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVICES, MORBIDITY& MORTALrIYWKLY. REP., Nov. 3, 1995, at 16-17. In
Minnesota the minimum age for tobacco consumption is 18, but three states
(Alabama, Alaska, and Utah) set the minimum age at 19. Id.; see also Phelps, supra
note 9, at A17. Although illegal, minors nationwide are successful in purchasing
tobacco products 70% of the time, while in Minnesota, the success rate is about
40%. See id.
193. See Food and Drugs, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,471. "[1]n a practical sense, ciga-
rette and smokeless tobacco advertising is proposing transactions that are ille-
gal... whether or not that is the advertiser's intent." Id.
194. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1512 (1996).
195. See Food and Drugs, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,398.
196. See id. at 44,471-72.
197. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73-74 (1983) (strik-
ing down a federal statute prohibiting unsolicited mailing of contraceptive ads).
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seeks support from the Court's holding in United States v. Edge Broadcasting
Co., 19 8 which upheld a prohibition on lottery advertisements in a state that
had outlawed lotteries.199 The rationale underlying the Edge Broadcasting
decision, however, does not justify tobacco advertisement restrictions.
Forbidding advertising in a state where the advertisements promote an il-
legal activity neither prejudices neighboring states where the activity is le-
gal nor the state where the activity is illegal. 2°° The restriction merely
regulates the conduct of advertisers pursuant to the laws of the state pro-
hibiting the activity. Information about out-of-state activity still can be ob-
tained by each state's citizens from advertisers based in other states. °1 In
contrast, the tobacco restrictions prejudice adults for whom tobacco is le-
gal nationwide. Asserting that tobacco advertisements relate to unlawful
activity strains the meaning of "relating to," because tobacco products are
legal for a majority of the population.0 2 The FDA's defense of this posi-
tion is less than impressive; it merely concludes that the tobacco restric-
tions arguably fail to satisfy the first prong of Central Hudson. °3 This ar-
gument would not persuade the courts that tobacco advertising deserves
no First Amendment protection.
b. Veracity
The FDA does not suggest that tobacco advertising is untruthful or
misleading. Instead, it focuses on the persuasiveness the ads possess by
virtue of images and colors that appeal to children.' Although it is possi-
ble that tobacco advertisements influence children to smoke, the adver-
tisements themselves do not lie. For example, the advertisements most
Responding to the argument that the advertising will reach young children, the
Bolger Court stated, "[T] he government may not reduce the adult population...
to reading only what is fit for children." Id. at 73 (citing Butler v. Michigan, 352
U.S. 380, 383 (1957)); see also Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 743 (4th
Cir. 1983) (acknowledging the scope of commercial speech protection but up-
holding a local ban on liquor advertisements, under Central Hudson, pursuant to a
state policy of discouraging liquor consumption). The Dunagin court noted that
"[t]he commercial speech doctrine would disappear if its protection ceased
whenever the advertised product might be used illegally. Peanut butter advertis-
ing cannot be banned just because someone might someday throw a jar at the
presidential motorcade." Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 743.
198. 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
199. See Food and Drugs, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,472 (citing Edge Broadcasting, 509
U.S. at 435-36).
200. See Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. at 428.
201. See id.
202. See Food and Drugs, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,471 (agreeing that although to-
bacco advertising relates to illegal activity with regard to sales to minors, "the ad-
vertising also relates to lawful activity - the sale of tobacco to adults").
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popular with young people (Joe Camel, the Marlboro Man, and Newport -
Alive with Pleasure)20 5 rely mostly on images with few words aside from the
product name.20 6 Their powers of persuasion lie in their appeals to the
imagination, not to logical, true-or-false informational determinations. 7
Truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech is not subject to regula-
tion merely because it is persuasive. 0 8 The Court in 44 Liquormart de-
scribed the dangers of false and misleading commercial speech, not per-
209suasive commercial speech. It expressed serious misgivings about
complete bans on commercial speech that is truthful and does not mislead
the recipient.2 0 Further, the Court has held that truthful, nonmisleading
commercial illustrations are entitled to the same First Amendment protec-
tions afforded to written and verbal commercial speech.2 1' Absent a show-
ing that the illustrations mislead the viewer, the mere possibility that some
members of the population find the illustration inappropriate cannot jus-
tify suppressing it. 
2
Examining the Supreme Court's commercial speech jurisprudence
shows that tobacco advertisements cannot be stripped of First Amendment
protection simply because young persons find them persuasive. To fall
outside the First Amendment protections, the advertisements must be
false or misleading. While tobacco advertisements doubtless glamorize
smoking, the images they convey are not subject to true or false distinc-
tions. Therefore, tobacco advertisements receive First Amendment pro-
tection and the FDA's proposed regulations will be deemed unconstitu-
205. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVICES, MORBIDIrY & MORTALryWKLY. REP., Aug. 19, 1994, at 577-81.
These three brands received 86% of the teenage cigarette market, which repre-
sented 35% of total sales. See id.
206. See Collins & Skover, supra note 54, at 737 (stating that image, not infor-
mation, is the touchstone of advertising in industries such as tobacco, alcohol,
and clothing).
207. See id. at 738. The absence of information in advertising is the basis for
the author's contention that it is inappropriate to use "false and misleading" as
criteria for the constitutional boundaries of commercial speech. Indeed, "truth is
irrelevant." Id.; see also PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE, supra
note 2, at 175-78.
208. See Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 743 (4th Cir. 1983) ("Our
policy is to leave it to the public to cope for themselves with Madison Avenue pa-
nache and hard sells.").
209. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1507-08 (1996).
210. Id. at 1508.
211. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985).
212. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977) (holding
that truthful, nonmisleading advertisements for contraceptives cannot be prohib-
ited because they relate to legal products and do not legitimize illicit sexual be-
havior); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971) (reversing conviction of a
defendant who walked through a courthouse corridor wearing a jacket bearing
the words, "Fuck the Draft," in a place where women and children were present).
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tional unless they survive scrutiny under the remaining three prongs of
the Central Hudson test.
2 1
3
2. The Second Prong: Substantial Government Interest
The second prong of Central Hudson requires that the asserted gov-
ernmental interest be substantial. 14 The FDA's stated purpose of the ad-
vertising regulations is "to decrease young people's use of tobacco prod-
ucts by ensuring that the restrictions on access are not undermined by the
product appeal that advertising for these products creates for young peo-
ple."2 '5  A reduction in the incidence of tobacco-related illnesses and
deaths purportedly would follow.2 1 6 The FDA claims its interest is a critical
public health issue essential to the survival of young persons at a pivotal
and impressionable age, when a decision to smoke may lock them into a
deadly addiction that steals from them their freedom to decide not to
smoke.1 7 The FDA deems its interest as compelling and not merely sub-
stantial.1 8 It even uses the "p" word in embracing the fact that the regula-
tions indeed are paternalistic toward minors.1 9
The Court historically has been solicitous of children because of their
impressionable natures. 20 The FDA's interest in reducing tobacco use eas-
ily survives scrutiny under Central Hudson's second prong in light of statis-
tics regarding tobacco-related deaths and health problems.22' Any argu-
213. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980).
214. Id. at 564.
215. Food and Drugs, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,616, 44,465 (1996).
216. Id. at 44,472.
217. Id. at 44,398. The FDA notes that "[miost people who suffer the adverse
health consequences of using cigarettes and smokeless tobacco begin their use
before they reach the age of 18, an age when they are not prepared for, or
equipped to, make a decision that for many, will have lifelong consequences." Id.
218. Id. at 44,472.
219. See id. at 44,473. "Nothing in 44 Liquormart, Inc., for example, suggests in
any way that government may not be paternalistic with respect to children and
adolescents under the age of 18." Id.; see also Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke,
101 F.3d 325, 329-30 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding substantial government interest in
protecting children who are unable to assess the value of advertising messages),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997).
220. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S.
Ct. 2374, 2386 (1996) (upholding broadcast restrictions under the Cable Televi-
sion Consumer Protection and Competition Act to protect children from inde-
cent programming); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978) (uphold-
ing broadcast restrictions on indecent speech); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629, 639-40 (1968) (upholding a statute that prohibited distribution of obscene
materials to minors); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) (holding
that government authority over children is broader than that over adults and that
the state's future depends upon healthy, well-rounded upbringing of its youth).
221. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text (discussing the health costs
1997]
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ment to the contrary ignores the stark reality of the hazards of tobacco
use.
3. The Third Prong: Direct Advancement of Government Interest
To satisfy the third prong of the Central Hudson test, the advertise-
ment restrictions must directly advance the government's interest in pro-
tecting young persons. The Central Hudson test commands that the limita-
tion on expression carefully be designed to achieve the state's goal.2 In
Rubin, the Supreme Court wrote that the advancement of the government
interest need be direct and material; speculation and conjecture will not
suffice.2 Restrictions imposed upon commercial speech must provide
more than ineffective or remote support to the achievement of the gov-
ernment's interest.*24 Anecdotal evidence and educated guesses about the
effectiveness of the restrictions will not be sufficient to establish a direct
225link between cigarette advertisements and use of tobacco by minors.
Therefore, the FDA faces a heavy factual burden in proving that the re-
strictions directly and to a material degree reduce smoking among mi-
226
nors.
This is where the room gets smoky. The FDA admits it must provide
credible evidence establishing that tobacco advertising often is a material
cause in a child's decision to start or continue smoking and that its restric-
tions on tobacco advertising will decrease the numbers of children who
227start and continue to smoke. It contends, however, that it need not pro-
vide conclusive, empirical evidence that the harms of tobacco advertising
to children are real and that the restrictions it proposes in fact will do any
228good . Taking such a position allows the FDA to avoid confronting the
fact that the government already knows that teen tobacco use cannot be
229explained by any one factor alone.
associated with smoking).
222. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 564 (1980).
223. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1995).
224. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
225. See Rubin, 514 U.S. at 490 (dismissing the government's evidence of a di-
rect link between the ban on alcohol content labeling and prevention of strength
wars as "various tidbits").
226. See id. at 486-87.
227. See Food and Drugs, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,474 (1996).
228. See id.
229. See PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE, supra note 2, at 123-
48 (discussing such causative psychosocial factors as socioeconomic status, gender,
age, accessibility, parental and peer use, and other personal factors that influence
children's decision to smoke); cf David Phelps, Tobacco in America, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Sept. 15, 1996, at A18 (quoting Clay Steinman, a professor of
communications studies at Macalester College in St. Paul, Minnesota: "It can't be
said that people smoke because of advertising, because there are places in the
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Communications theorists posit that the link between commercial
advertising and consumer action is more complicated and tenuous than
just seeing and acting.230 The theorists assert that advertising generally at-
tempts little and achieves less when trying to persuade non-smokers to
smoke rather than merely attempting to persuade consumers who already
are users of a product to retain brand loyalty and to persuade smokers to
try a different product.23' One theorist admits, however, that tobacco ad-
vertising bans would save some lives, 32 but he cautions that the degree to
which the restrictions would reduce smoking-related deaths may be star-
tlingly small.
233
Since R.J. Reynolds introduced its hugely successful Old Joe Camel
ad campaign in 1988, health professionals also have sought to link the ad-
vertisements to children's smoking. 2 4 The evidence indicates that chil-
dren recognize cigarette advertisements more readily than adults. 5
Medical experts hypothesize that even in view of the absence of cigarette
advertising from television and the fact that very young children cannot
read, the ubiquity of cigarette advertising alone is the cause for such high
rates of child recall of Old Joe Camel. 6 The Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention collected data showing that the percentages of smokers
aged twelve to eighteen buying Marlboro, Camel, and Newport cigarettes
increased dramatically from 1989 to 1993 during the Camel campaign and
widespread increases in advertising expenditures. 37 Even though evi-
dence shows Old Joe is as familiar as Mickey Mouse to most children, it is
still impossible to predict with absolute certainty how exposure to tobacco
world where there is no advertising and they smoke like chimneys").
230. See Ross D. PETIY, THE IMPACT OF ADVERTISING LAw ON BUSINESS AND
PUBLIC POLICY 31-34 (1992). Petty asserts that most communications models of
how advertising affects consumers involve four stages through which the con-
sumer must pass before the advertising has any effect. Id. The consumer must 1)
perceive the ad; 2) pay attention to it; 3) comprehend its message; and 4) com-
pare the message to his or her beliefs about the product or brand. See id. A per-
son's existing beliefs play a pivotal role. See id.
231. See, e.g., Michael Schudson, Symbols and Smokers: Advertising Health Mes-
sages, and Public Policy, in SMOKING POLICY: LAw, POLITICS, AND CULTURE, supra
note 1, at 208, 209.
232. See id. at 221.
233. See id. at 223.
234. See, e.g., John P. Pierce et al., Does Tobacco Advertising Target Young People to
Start Smoking?, 266JAMA 3154, 3155 (1991).
235. See, e.g., id.
236. See Paul M. Fischer et al., Brand Logo Recognition by Children Aged 3 to 6
Years, 266JAMA 3145, 3148 (1991).
237. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, CHANGES IN THE
CIGARETTE BRAND PREFERENCES OF ADOLESCENT SMOKERS - UNITED STATES 578 (1989-
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advertising affects later smoking behavior.23 ' Although it can be admitted
that advertising is a factor in minors' decisions to smoke, other factors play
211a role, not the least of which is peer pressure.
The rigorous standards for proving the third prong of the Central
Hudson test call into question whether the regulations sufficiently would
achieve the government's end in decreasing smoking rates among mi-240
nors. In 44 Liquormart, the Court was not convinced that a complete ban
on price advertising of alcohol directly advanced the state's interest in
promoting temperance.2 4' Likewise, in Rubin, a ban on alcohol content on
beer labels was found not to advance directly the goal of preventing alco-
hol strength wars.242 The FDA's challenge in satisfying this factor, then, is
not that it must show that tobacco advertising regulations advance the
state's interest. The challenge lies in demonstrating that the regulations
do so to a material degree. Isolating a direct causal link between tobacco
advertisements and child and adolescent smoking presents a substantial
problem in itself. Proving that the link is material, amidst so many societal
factors contributing to child and adolescent tobacco use, would be even
more difficult.
In support of its argument that the restrictions would curb adoles-
cent smoking in a direct and material way, the FDA cites studies of to-
bacco advertising bans in the United Kingdom, Norway, Finland, Canada,
and New Zealand. 24 The FDA ignores the presence of other elements of
238. See Fischer et al., supra note 236, at 3148 (1991). But see Joseph R. Di-
Franza et al., RJR Nabisco's Cartoon Camel Promotes Camel Cigarettes to Children, 266
JAMA 3149, 3152 (1991) (finding a direct link between tobacco advertising and
youth smoking).
239. See PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE, supra note 2, at 123-
48; see alsoJosephine Marcotty & Ann Merrill, Can FDA Regulations Keep Youths from
Getting Hooked?, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 24, 1996 at Al, A16 (reporting
that no evidence shows that regulations to restrict the marketing and sale of ciga-
rettes to minors have any impact on teen smoking rates).
240. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1508-09 (1996).
241. Id. at 1509-10. The federal district court in 44 Liquormart declined to fol-
low Dunagin v. City of Oxford and other cases that assume there is a direct link be-
tween advertising and consumption. See 44 Liquor Mart v. Racine, 829 F. Supp.
543, 554 (D.R.I. 1993). Other courts have found the link to be self-evident. See,
e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 569
(1980) (finding an immediate connection between advertising and demand for
electricity); Capitol Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(finding a "close relationship" between cigarette broadcast advertising and poten-
tial influence on the young), af'd sub nom. Capitol Broad. Co. v. Kleindienst, 405
U.S. 1000 (1972) (mem.); Queensgate Inv. Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 433
N.E.2d 138, 142 (Ohio) (finding advertising of drink prices would stimulate con-
sumption and prohibition would help prevent consumption), appeal dismissed, 459
U.S. 807 (1982).
242. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1995).
243. Food and Drugs, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,491, 44,491-92 (1996).
[Vol. 23
32
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol23/iss3/6
TOBACCO TALK
anti-tobacco legislation packages - such as health warnings, health educa-
tion, and sales restrictions - that contributed to decreased smoking preva-
lence, preferring to take stock in the researchers' conclusion that advertis-
ing was the major cause for decreased consumption rates.
The FDA's parting shot referred to a common-sense approach.2
Why would the tobacco industry spend billions of dollars a year on adver-
tising when it did not directly and materially attract new smokers, retain
present users of their brands, and convert users of other brands?246 Lig-
gett's admissions that it directed advertising at minors give some credence
147to these numbers, but 44 Liquormart requires more than common sense
- it requires hard facts.24' Advertising alone simply may retain present us-
ers and convert users of other brands without attracting a significant
number of young new smokers.
Under 44 Liquormart, there must be evidence that the restrictions will
significantly reduce consumption to satisfy the third prong of the Central
Hudson test.249 Given the difficulty in establishing the extent to which ad-
vertising directly and significantly causes minors to smoke, the available
evidence weighs against the FDA. Evidence that is more than anecdotal
tends to show that tobacco advertising contributes to children's and ado-
lescents' decisions to use tobacco, but drawing conclusions from this evi-
dence necessitates a modicum of educated guesswork, against which Rubin
warned.25 ° Consequently, the tobacco regulations fail to satisfy the third
prong of the Central Hudson test. This failure alone would invalidate the
regulations. The discussion in the following section explores the fate of
the regulations were they to survive this prong.
4. The Fourth Prong: No More Extensive Than Necessary
The last prong of the Central Hudson test requires that the regulations
be no more extensive than necessary to serve the government's interest in
244. See id.
245. See id. at 44,474-75; see also Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618,
628 (1995) (holding history, consensus, and simple common sense may support a
finding of direct advancement between advertising and action).
246. See PREVENTING ToBAcco USE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE, supra note 2, at 160-
62, 164, 166; see also Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 749 (4th Cir. 1983)
("It is beyond our ability to understand why huge sums of money would be de-
voted to the promotion of sales of liquor without expected results, or continue
without realized results.").
247. See Jolie Solomon & Adam Rogers, Turning a New Leaf: Liggett Breaks
Ranks with Big Tobacco, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 31, 1997, at 50.
248. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1509 (1996).
249. Id.
250. See DiFranza et al., supra note 238, at 3151-52 (arguing that by ages 16 to
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protecting children.25'- This element requires an acceptable, sufficient, or
reasonable fit between the abridgment of speech and the government in-
terest.252 It must be remembered that regulations on the time, place, and
manner of expression are permitted only when the restrictions are im-
posed without reference to the content of the message and leave open al-
ternative channels for communication of the information. 253 As with the
third prong, the Court defers somewhat to legislative judgment in evaluat-
ing the extent of governmental regulations,254 but the amount of defer-
ence has been limited by 44 Liquormart.255 The following analysis presup-
poses that the FDA regulations in fact would satisfy the third prong of the
Central Hudson test. It addresses each of the main advertising restrictions
individually to determine whether they are no more restrictive than neces-
sary to satisfy the government's interest in reducing underage smoking.
Then the cumulative effect of the restrictions is evaluated.
a. Format and Content Requirements for Labeling and
Advertising
First, the FDA's regulations on format and content requirements for
labeling and advertising images prohibit a significant amount of commer-
cial speech promoting cigarette brands. 256 The FDA asserts that its regula-
tions "attempted to preserve the informational components of advertising
and labeling which can provide useful product information for adult
smokers, while eliminating the imagery and color that make advertising
appealing and compelling to children and adolescents under 18 years of
age. "217 The regulation exempts adult publications; billboards receive no
exemption.2 -8 On-site advertising is exempt only if it is not visible from the
street and is affixed to a wall or fixture inside a building.
The result of these restrictions is that images and colors are elimi-
251. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
569-70 (1980).
252. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1510 (1996);
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 483-86 (1995).
253. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 633-34 (1995); Linmark
Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 92-94 (1977); Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771
(1976).
254. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 508 (1981).
255. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1511; see also Rubin, 514 U.S. at 482 n.2.
256. Format and Content Requirements, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,617 (1996) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.32).
257. Scope of Permissible Forms of Labeling and Advertising, 61 Fed. Reg.
44,617, 44,465 (1996).
258. Format and Content Requirements, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,617 (1996) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.32 (a) (2)).
259. See id. (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.32(a) (1)).
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nated from every channel of communication but adult publications and
on-site ads. This is not a complete ban but, in practical terms, comes very
close because the tobacco advertising's message is completely hidden from
those adults who do not open the appropriate publication or enter the
appropriate store. Under 44 Liquormart's scrutiny, which could apply to
more than just blanket bans in a particular case given the Court's inclina-
tion to increase First Amendment protections for commercial speech,
such a significant abridgment may not withstand application of the fourth
prong of Central Hudson.
Further, problems could arise because the tobacco manufacturer,
distributor, or retailer has the burden of proving the publication in which
it advertises is an adult publication, which could create erroneous or
fraudulent survey evidence for borderline publications such as Rolling
Stone, which attract both adult and teen readers. "0 Aside from the practi-
cal problems of distinguishing adult and nonadult publications, the fact
that a tobacco manufacturer would have to prove its worthiness to speak
calls into question whether the regulation is an invalid prior restraint.26" '
Images and colors in contemporary advertising are themselves in-
formation about politics, religion, ideology, and customs, with "a unifying
theme of consumption."262 Completely stripping away the images and col-
ors that convey information in ways that cannot be captured by black text
on white background 263 constitutes a blanket ban on an aspect of advertis-
ing that is neither false nor misleading as required by 44 Liquormart.
26
4
Cigarette advertising may depict illogical associations,265 yet because the
FDA does not assert these ads are false or misleading, the ads cannot be
completely abridged unless it is shown they do more than distort reality. 66
Advertising's modus operandi always has been to create a "Land of Oz" 267
without crossing the line into material falsehood. 26'
These true and legal format and content aspects of tobacco advertis-
ing are no less "informational" than the price advertisement restrictions in
44 Liquormart or the alcohol content restrictions in Rubin and are far more
260. See id.; see also Scope of Permissible Forms of Labeling and Advertising, 61
Fed. Reg. 44,617 (1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.30(a)(2)) (requiring
manufacturers intending to advertise in media not listed in the regulations to no-
tify the FDA of the media and its visibility to those under age 18).
261. See supra Part II.A (discussing historical disfavor for prior restraints on
speech).
262. Collins & Skover, supra note 54, at 709-10.
263. See id. at 710.
264. See44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1508 (1996).
265. See Collins & Skover, supra note 54, at 711.
266. See id. at 709. Advertisements wrap up emotions and sell them back to us,
rather than assert falsehoods about the products. See id.
267. See id. at 710.
268. SeePE=TY, supra note 230, at 22, 79. Advertising always has walked the line
between sales puffery and false assertions. See id.
19971
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common.269 Many adults would be insulated from the format and content
of tobacco messages because they do not venture into those establish-
ments or read those publications that depict the tobacco advertisements.
The only way the regulations might satisfy the "no more than necessary"
Central Hudson prong would be for a significant number of publications to
be deemed adult, and hence be able to exhibit tobacco ads. This seems to
be a meager and uncertain, rather than ample, alternative channel of
communication. Thus the format and content requirements should fail,
especially in light of the equally dramatic restriction on outdoor advertis-
ing, which is discussed next.
b. Outdoor Advertising
The second major category of advertising restrictions limits outdoor
advertising, prohibiting billboards, signs, placards, or displays outside a
facility that sells cigarettes and restricting advertisements located inside a
building if the advertisement is visible from outside the building.2 70 The
format and content restrictions apply on top of these restrictions.27' To
withstand a First Amendment challenge, the restrictions on cigarette ad-
vertising must create a reasonable fit between the goal and the restriction,
and alternative channels of communication must exist.
2 72
The tobacco industry's willingness to eliminate outdoor advertising
completely if the government immunizes tobacco companies from liability
for the costs federal and state governments pay to provide health care for
those with smoking-related diseases gives no credence to the legality of the
273
ban. The value of blanket immunity from smoking damage suits is well
worth the advertising sacrifice.
In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, which "deal [t] with the law of
billboards," the Supreme Court allowed the City of San Diego to prohibit
billboards in some areas of the city for reasons of traffic, safety, and aes-
thetics.2 74 The Metromedia Court held that cities may distinguish between
the relative value of different categories of commercial speech and regu-
late accordingly.2 75 In other cases, however, content-neutral, blanket bans
on outdoor signs and displays generally have not been upheld by the Su-
269. See Collins & Skover, supra note 54, at 709-10.
270. See Scope of Permissible Forms of Labeling and Advertising, 61 Fed. Reg.
44,167 (1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 897.30(b), 897.32(a) (1)).
271. See Format and Content Requirements, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,617 (1996) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.32(a) (1)-(2)).
272. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
273. See Saundra Torry & John Schwartz, Tobacco Firms' Concessions Taking
Shape, WASH. POST, May 1, 1997, at Al.
274. 453 U.S. 490, 507-08 (1981).
275. Id. at 514.
[Vol. 23
36
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol23/iss3/6
TOBACCO TALK
preme Court.27 6 The regulation in Metromedia was upheld as an exercise of
the police power and not as a reasonable time, place, and manner regula-
tion.2 77 Further, Metromedia's facts did not involve the same extent of re-
striction on outdoor advertising as the FDA restrictions on tobacco adver-
tising.78 On-site advertising was not restricted.279
Two recent Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' decisions upholding
sweeping bans on outdoor advertising illustrate that the FDA's restrictions
on outdoor advertising could comply with the fourth prong of the Central
Hudson test. Significantly, this is the same circuit in which the FDA restric-
tions will be evaluated.28 ° In Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke,281 the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals found a ban on outdoor alcohol advertisements
constitutional. 2 Similarly, the court in Penn Advertising, Inc. v. Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore8 approved bans on cigarette ads. 4 The restric-
tions upheld in Anheuser-Busch and Penn Advertising banned cigarette and
alcohol ads in any publicly visible location, with exceptions for industrial
and commercially zoned areas as well as for signs on vehicles used to
transport cigarettes and at businesses that sell cigarettes. 2 1 In each case,
the court of appeals found that reasonable alternative channels for the
dissemination of information regarding alcohol and tobacco products ex-
280isted. Moreover, the link between the restrictions and the goal of reduc-
ing the use of these products was especially sufficient because the restric-
tion did not have to be the least restrictive means available.28 7  The
opinions stressed that a city must be able to use less-than-perfect means to
directly advance its legitimate goal of protecting children.28
276. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 424 (1993)
(striking down complete, content-based ban on commercial handbill news racks);
Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977) (striking
down complete ban on residential "For Sale" signs).
277. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 515-16.
278. Id. at 508, 515-16 n.20.
279. See id. at 494.
280. See Torry, supra note 15, at F7.
281. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke ("Anheuser-Busch I), 63 F.3d 1305 (4th
Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 1821, on remand, ("Anheuser-Busch II"),
101 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997).
282. Anheuser-Busch II, 101 F.3d at 330.
283. Penn Advertising, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council ("Penn Advertising I"), 63
F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2575, on remand, ("Penn
AdvertisingII"), 101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997).
284. See Penn Advertising I, 101 F.3d at 332.
285. See Anheuser-Busch I, 63 F.3d at 1308 & n.2; Penn Advertising I, 63 F.3d at
1321 & n.1.
286. See Anheuser-Busch II, 101 F.3d at 329; Penn Advertising I, 101 F.3d at 332.
287. See Anheuser-Busch 1, 63 F.3d at 1315.
288. See id. at 1316; Penn AdvertisingI, 63 F.3d at 1326; see also Anheuser-Busch II,
101 F.3d at 330 ("Baltimore's ordinance attempts to protect its children in a
manner and with a motive distinct from those evidenced by Rhode Island in 44
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The FDA's restrictions on outdoor advertising appear similar to the
Penn Advertising and Anheuser-Busch restrictions. They purport to leave
open alternative channels of communication. However, the FDA regula-
tions prohibit "billboards, posters, or placards... within 1,000 feet of the
perimeter of any public playground or playground area in a public park,
elementary school, or secondary school."28 9 Given the numbers of parks in
many cities, this prohibition may be close to a complete ban on outdoor
tobacco advertisements in many areas. 290 Nevertheless, Anheuser-Busch
noted that the Supreme Court accepted a broad ban in the Metromedia
case because no effective, less restrictive means existed.2 91 As discussed
above, the Metromedia case is distinguishable. 92 Further, even though no
less restrictive means may exist and the least restrictive means need not be
used, under 44 Liquormart, the FDA has not proposed sufficient evidence
to conclude that the advertising restrictions would be effective in prevent-
ing adolescent consumers from becoming new smokers.292 Thus even if
there is no less restrictive means available, the method used must be
proven to be effective, which is not the case with the FDA restrictions.
The FDA restrictions reach further than the government regulations
upheld in Metromedia, Anheuser-Busch, and Penn Advertising. Unlike the
Metromedia regulations,294 the FDA tobacco regulations require that on-site
295and off-site advertising disappear from view. In addition, the general
format and content requirements for labeling and advertising apply to
billboards that could remain under the regulations because they are not
Liquormart and in accord with an unbroken chain of Supreme Court cases which
indicate its desire to ensure that children do not become lost in the marketplace
of ideas.").
289. Scope of Permissible Forms of Labeling and Advertising, 61 Fed. Reg.
44,617 (1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.30(b)). The FDA identified pub-
lic parks containing swings, seesaws, baseball diamonds, or basketball courts as
places where tobacco advertising must not be within 1000 feet. Id.
290. See Merrill, supra note 17, at A17 (quoting Kippy Burns, spokeswoman for
the Outdoor Advertising Association of America, Inc., who complains, "In many
urban areas if you draw a circle 1000 feet from these areas, in effect you've got a
ban"). The cigarette industry has a voluntary "Cigarette Advertising and Promo-
tion Code," which contains a similar provision concerning schools and play-
grounds; the FDA concluded that this code reinforced the reasonableness of its
restriction. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,502.
291. See Anheuser-Busch , 63 F.3d at 1316.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 274-79.
293. See supra Part IV.B.3 (discussing why there is insufficient evidence under
44 Liquormart to find that the tobacco regulations will directly advance the gov-
emnment's interest in preventing adolescent smoking).
294. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 512 (1981).
295. See Scope of Permissible Forms of Labeling and Advertising, 61 Fed. Reg.
44,617 (1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.30(b)); Format and Content Re-
quirements for Labeling and Advertising, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,617 (1996) (to be codi-
fied at 21 C.F.R. § 897.32(a) (1)).
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exempted like adult publications."' Thus, even where the regulations
would allow billboards to remain, they would strip away image and color
information content and effectively ban an informational component of
the advertisement, which is contrary to 44 Liquormart and Rubin. In effect,
either the billboard is banned or the image and color content are banned;
either choice is unacceptable under 44 Liquormart.
Viewed as a whole, the FDA regulations, like the regulations in Penn
Advertising and Anheuser-Busch, allow some alternatives in magazines and
newspapers aimed at adults and even on the Internet.27 Overall, however,
these are suspect and unproven channels because they could remain hid-,
den from a majority of the adult population. Thus, the restriction of out-
door advertising likely would fail the last prong of the Central Hudson test,
because it is more than necessary to achieve the FDA's goal.
c. Sale and Promotion of Nontobacco Items
Finally, the FDA regulations are meant to prohibit the tobacco indus-
try's sale and advertisement of nontobacco items, services, and gifts, as
well as prohibit sponsorship of events in the name of a tobacco brand or
image.2 s The language of the regulations is absolute and implicates all
media of advertising because of the ban on promotion of events with to-
bacco brand names.29 However, it is reasonable to ban gifts, free tobacco
product samples, and even sales of nontobacco products embossed with
identifying logos. The messages these more recently developed advertis-
ing forms convey are easily transferred through alternative traditional
forms of advertising.' °°
The availability of free or mail-order samples and related specialty
items to children who merely must claim to be of legal age certainly con-
stitutes a reasonable step in protecting children. Ensuring that tobacco
items dispensed in this manner go to a person of legal age is very diffi-
cult.3 1 Some specialty items that are given away, such as lighters, do more
296. See Format and Content Requirements for Labeling and Advertising, 61
Fed. Reg. at 44,617 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.32(a)).
297. See Scope of Permissible Forms of Labeling and Advertising, 61 Fed. Reg.
at 44,617 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 897.30(a)(1)-(2)).
298. Sale and Distribution of Nontobacco Items and Services, Gifts and Spon-
sorship of Events, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,617, 44,617-18 (1996) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. § 897.34(a)-(c)).
299. See id. The prohibition on nontobacco gifts or sponsorships reaches any
tobacco product "brand name (alone or in conjunction with any other word),
logo, symbol, motto, selling message, recognizable color or pattern of colors, or
any other indicia of product identification identical or similar to, or identifiable
with, those used for any brand of cigarettes or smokeless tobacco." Id.
300. See PREVENTING ToBAcco USE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE, supra note 2, at 186.
301. See id. ("Although the cigarette manufacturers argue that samples are not
intended for nonusers or minors, there is little evidence of distribution control.").
1997]
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than advertise; they encourage and supply a means to use cigarette sam-
ples that may accompany the lighter.302 Furthermore, specialty items such
as shirts or towels, available for purchase from the manufacturer (such as
those available in the Camel Cash Catalog), usually do not contain health
warnings. Consequently, the advertisements fail to provide a complete
picture of the hazards associated with tobacco use. 3 This aspect of the
regulations is a reasonable step toward the goal of protecting children.
d. FDA Regulations: Operating in Concert
When addressed independent of each other, the FDA's proposed re-
strictions on format and content, outdoor advertising, and nontobacco
items have a chance to survive Supreme Court review. Operating to-
gether, however, the restrictions eliminate the required ample alternative
channels of communicating truthful, legal tobacco advertising. Linking
the ban on colors and images with the restrictions on outdoor advertising
and advertising of nontobacco items leaves few meaningful outlets for the
communication of information. Those that do remain are bereft of in-
formational content in the form of colors and images. Such complete
bans on informational content contradict the Supreme Court's holdings
in 44 Liquormart and Rubin. This is particularly significant given the
Court's willingness to apply rigorous scrutiny to restrictions on commer-
cial speech.
Although careful to purport that the regulations were designed so
tobacco messages would reach adults only, the FDA cut off most, if not all,
outlets for tobacco advertising available to many adults. Such a result hin-
ders consumer choice and obscures the tobacco issue from public debate,
an outcome contrary to First Amendment values and commercial speech
doctrine.
C. The Aftermath of an Application of the Central Hudson Test to the
FDA Tobacco Regulations
Tobacco advertising relates to a legal product and is not false or mis-
leading. Therefore, tobacco advertisements enjoy First Amendment pro-
tection, satisfying the first prong of the Central Hudson test. Without ques-
tion, the government maintains a substantial interest in preventing
children from using tobacco products. Hence, the restrictions meet the
requirements of Central Hudson's second prong. Under the last two
prongs, which require that the restrictions directly and materially advance
the government's interest and abridge no more speech than necessary,
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FDA thus far has failed to provide the level of evidence required under 44
Liquormart to link tobacco advertising with adolescent tobacco use, and the
restrictions abridge more commercial speech than necessary to achieve its
goal.
The restrictions, when operating in concert, create a ban on ele-
ments of tobacco advertising that is more extensive than necessary to meet
the FDA's goal of curbing teen smoking. The regulations fail to allow am-
ple alternative channels for communicating truthful and informational
messages about legal tobacco products. The regulations abridge commer-
cial speech for the goal of protecting children, but they significantly hin-
der adult consumers' access to tobacco information and remove the issue
of tobacco use from public debate.
When taken individually, the format and content requirements could
survive because they do not eliminate images and color from adult publi-
cations and on-site ads, potentially ample alternative modes of communi-
cation, if enough are proven to be read and seen mainly by adults. While
banning outdoor advertisements presents a potentially reasonable time,
place, and manner regulation, the regulations reach too far by banning
any visible sign and informational elements of the remaining visible dis-
plays. This is especially true when evaluated in conjunction with the for-
mat and content restrictions. The government may be able to regulate
tobacco advertising on a more limited basis, but not through such a com-
prehensive system of commercial speech restrictions.
D. Alternative Avenues for Reducing Child and Adolescent Use of
Tobacco
Since Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the Court explicitly has rejected pa-
ternalistic governmental regulation in favor of more consumer informa-
304tion, not less. The FDA's regulations, however, do not incorporate edu-
cational programs, direct regulation, increased taxation, or
counterspeech, all of which were cited by the Court in 44 Liquormart0 5 and
recommended by the Surgeon General. °6  Direct taxation and anti-
smoking counterspeech already are proven alternatives. The FDA said
that it believes educational programs can be effective but would not re-
quire such programs of the tobacco industry itself.0 8 Even so, the alterna-
304. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("[T]he remedy to be applied is more speech,
not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression.").
305. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1510 (1996).
306. See PREVENTING ToBAcco USE AMONGYOUNG PEOPLE, supra note 2, at 209.
307. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
& HuMAN SERVICES, MORBIDITY & MoRTALnYWKLY. REP., Nov. 8, 1996, 966, 969.
308. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,539 (1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 801).
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tives to speech suppression - particularly counterspeech, of which educa-
tional programs are a part - present a more favorable and more effective
solution. Proponents already call anti-smoking ads aimed at children a
success. Counterspeech presents a method true to First Amendment
values that can be more effective than forced silence. 10
In 44 Liquormart, the Supreme Court noted that direct regulation and
increased taxation are ways to increase prices and decrease consump-
tion.31 One commentator has suggested that an increased tax on tobacco
products could be used to place anti-smoking commercials back on the
airwaves with pro-smoking commercials.3 1 2 The newest market for nico-
tine, which includes gums and patches to help people quit using tobacco,
is an effective competitor. 3  The government also could provide tax
breaks and incentives for these companies to advertise. Furthermore, ad-
vice and information provided by pharmacists who provide smoking cessa-
tion products has proven very effective in smoking cessation.314 In addi-
tion, state efforts to prohibit youths from purchasing tobacco should be
increased to lower the high rates of successful purchases by minors. The
FDA's regulations, by not adopting or incorporating these approaches, in-
fringe on free speech and fail to maximize the FDA's goal of reduced to-
bacco consumption.
V. CONCLUSION
The FDA's proposed tobacco advertising regulations fail the Su-
preme Court's most recent interpretation of the Central Hudson test as ex-
pressed in 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island. While the goal of protecting chil-
dren from tobacco use is unassailable, the FDA failed to prove with the
certainty required under 44 Liquormart that the restrictions directly ad-
vance this interest. Moreover, the regulations are more restrictive than
necessary to achieve the FDA's goal. Overall, the FDA regulations fail the
third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test. By ignoring alternative
ways to reduce child and adolescent tobacco use, the FDA ignores tradi-
tional First Amendment values and contemporary commercial speech pro-
309. See, e.g., Bob Christmen, State's Anti-Smoking Ads Called Effective with Teens,
DAILY STAR (Ariz.), Aug. 30, 1996, at 7C.
310. See Schudson, supra note 231, at 211-12, 219 (detailing the success of
1968-70 anti-smoking advertising and explaining the advantages of inexpensive
public health, anti-smoking messages; asserting that even if the ads do not create
direct decreases in present smokers, the number of people who refuse to start
smoking because of the ads is worth the effort).
311. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1510 (1996).
312. See GARTNER, supra note 85, at 31.
313. SeeJanet M. Telepchak, Smoking Cessation: New Strategies and Opportunities
for Pharmacists, AM. DRUGGIST, Jan. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10066044, at *2.
314. See id. at *2, *5, *9.
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tections. The heightened scrutiny that the present Court gives to abridg-
ments of true and nonmisleading speech about legal products is the death
knell for such comprehensive restrictions on tobacco advertising.
Scott Sullivan
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